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We study the problem of impartial selection, a topic that lies at the intersection of computational social choice
and mechanism design. The goal is to select the most popular individual among a set of community members.
The input can be modeled as a directed graph, where each node represents an individual, and a directed edge
indicates nomination or approval of a community member to another. An impartial mechanism is robust to
potential selfish behavior of the individuals and provides appropriate incentives to voters to report their true
preferences by ensuring that the chance of a node to become a winner does not depend on its outgoing edges.
The goal is to design impartial mechanisms that select a node with an in-degree that is as close as possible to
the highest in-degree. We measure the efficiency of such a mechanism by the difference of these in-degrees,
known as its additive approximation.
Following the success in the design of auction and posted pricing mechanisms with good approximation
guarantees for welfare and profit maximization, we study the extent to which prior information on voters’
preferences could be useful in the design of efficient deterministic impartial selection mechanisms with good
additive approximation guarantees. We consider three models of prior information, which we call the opin-
ion poll, the a priori popularity, and the uniform model. We analyze the performance of a natural selection
mechanism that we call approval voting with default (AVD) and show that it achieves a O(
√
= ln=) additive
guarantee for opinion poll and a O(ln2 =) for a priori popularity inputs, where = is the number of individuals.
We consider this polylogarithmic bound as our main technical contribution. We complement this last result
by showing that our analysis is close to tight, showing an Ω(ln=) lower bound. This holds in the uniform
model, which is the simplest among the three models.
1 INTRODUCTION
We study the problem of impartial selection, which has recently attracted a lot of attention from a
social choice theory and mechanism design point of view. The goal is to select the most popular
individual, among a set of community members. The input can be modeled as a directed graph,
where each node represents an individual, and a directed edge indicates nomination or approval
of a community member to another. A selection mechanism takes a graph as input and returns a
single node as the winner. This would be a trivial task from the algorithmic point of view, but the
challenge here is that the true preferences of the individuals are private information known only
to them. In settings where each individual is simultaneously a voter and a candidate and therefore
has also personal interest in becoming awinner, shemaymanipulate themechanism andmisreport
her true preferences if this could increase her chance to win. An impartial mechanism is robust
to such behavior, and provides appropriate incentives to voters to report their true preferences by
ensuring that the chance of a node to become a winner, does not depend on its outgoing edges.
Unfortunately, it is well-known that the obvious selection mechanism that always returns the
highest in-degree node as a winner, suffers from possible manipulation, i.e., it is not impartial. The
challenge is to design an impartial selection mechanism that selects a winner with an in-degree
that approximates well the highest in-degree.
Impartial selection, was introduced independently by Holzman and Moulin [19] and Alon et
al. [1]. The former work considered minimum axiomatic properties that impartial selection rules
should satisfy, while the latter quantified the efficiency loss with the notion of the approximation
ratio, defined as the worst-case ratio of the maximum in-degree over the in-degree of the node
which is selected by the mechanism. This line of research concluded with the work of Fischer and
Klimm [15], who proposed randomized impartial mechanisms with optimal approximation ratio.
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It is well-known [1, 15] that the most challenging nomination profiles in terms of their approxi-
mation ratio, for both deterministic and randomized mechanisms, are those with small in-degrees.
In particular, all deterministic impartial mechanisms have unbounded ratio, and this can be demon-
strated even on inputs with two nodes and of maximum in-degree of 1 (see [1] for an example).
Inspired by this crucial observation, Bousquet et al. [8] designed impartial randomizedmechanisms
that return a nearly optimal node when the maximum in-degree is high enough. Caragiannis et
al. [10] went one step further to quantify this effect, by advocating that additive approximation
may be a more appropriate measure to evaluate impartial mechanisms, and also by providing
mechanisms with sublinear additive approximation guarantees.
The most natural and well-studied selection rule is the approval voting rule (AV), which has re-
ceived much attention in social choice theory [22]. In our context, AV always returns the node
with the highest in-degree. Unfortunately, as already mentioned, this mechanism is not impartial.
The reason is that in case of a tie at the maximumdegree, some of the nodes involved in the tie may
have incentive to vote non-truthfully. Fortunately, there is a simple fix of this deficiency, which is
inspired by the simpler plurality with default mechanism by Holzman and Moulin [19]; in case of
a tie, select as winner a predetermined/default node. We refer to this modified version of AV as ap-
proval voting with default (AVD). Although (a careful implementation of) this tweak re-establishes
impartiality, this modification comes at a cost, as this preselection should be independent of the
input graph. Imagine a scenario, where there is a tie between two nodes with the maximum degree.
In the unfortunate situation where the default node receives only a small number of votes, this
might lead to a poor additive approximation, linear in the number of nodes.
Most of the previous work consider randomized mechanisms, hence the efficiency is measured
in expectation. However, in the design of selection mechanisms, determinism is arguably more
desirable. Unfortunately, all the known deterministic mechanisms have very poor, linear additive
approximation, and it is wide open whether substantially better mechanisms exist.
In this work, we take a different route: we study the extent to which prior information on the
preferences of the voters could allow the design of deterministic impartial selection mechanisms
with good additive approximation guarantees. Our focus is on the analysis of AVD, for which our
design choice boils down to an effective choice of the default node, with the help of the prior
information. We assume that the preferences are drawn from a probability distribution that is
known to the mechanism. We assume throughout voter independence,1 that is, the random choice
of preferences for each voter is independent of those of the others.
We propose different models that capture several aspects of the problem. In the opinion poll
model, we assume that the prior information concerns information about the preferences of dif-
ferent (types of) voters. The designer has access to the probability ?8 ((), with which voter 8 (or all
voters of type 8) would approve a subset ( of candidates. The a priori popularitymodel assumes that
the designer has prior information about the popularity of each candidate 9 , which is summarized
by a scalar ? 9 . We assume that each candidate 9 receives independently a vote from each voter
with probability ? 9 . As a special case, we also study the uniform model, in which every candidate
9 has the same popularity ? 9 = ? .
Note that these models capture different information scenarios; the former assumes that the
designer has access to opinion poll statistics for each (type of) voter, while the latter assumes that
the designer has access only to aggregate information about the popularity of a candidate. This
aggregation is over the whole population of voters, as the actual information may be sanitized to
preserve anonymity of those (types) participated in the poll. Note that popularity may measure
other forms of biases over specific individuals. For example, consider the situation in which a PC
1We should note that, with correlated distributions there is not much one can achieve (see Example 1 in the appendix).
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wants to decide the best paper award; then, the a priori popularity of a paper could be a function
of the authors’ esteem, affiliation, etc.
1.1 Contribution and techniques
Our main focus is the analysis of the AVD mechanism. We begin with the opinion poll model and,
as a warm-up, in Section 3, we present a simple mechanism that ignores the edges of the graph
and selects as winner a pre-selected node ofmaximum expected in-degree. We call this mechanism
the constant mechanism, and show that it is Θ(
√
= ln=)-additive (Theorem 5, Theorem 6). The
AVD mechanism that selects as default the node of highest expected in-degree, can only perform
better than the constant mechanism. Our main and most technically involved result shows that
this version of the AVD is O(ln2 =)-additive in the a priori popularity model (Theorem 7). We
complement this result by showing that our analysis is tight, up to a logarithmic factor: even for
uniform inputs where all candidates are a priori equally popular, there is a class of instances for
which AVD has additive approximation Ω(ln=), for any choice of the default node (Theorem 13).
The analysis of the constant mechanism serves multiple purposes. It illustrates that when prior
information is available, a low expected additive approximation is achievable even by simple de-
terministic mechanisms, and by the simplest statistic of the prior, that is the expected in-degree.
This is in sharp contrast to the no-prior case, where deterministic mechanisms have a very poor
performance for both additive [10] and multiplicative approximation [1]. Second, the analysis of
the constant mechanism is quite simple; e.g., the upper bound follows by a simple application
of the Hoeffding bound. However, it introduces some of the techniques (such as tail inequalities
and reverse Chernoff bounds) that our strongest results in Sections 4 and 5 use. Finally, the upper
bound on the expected additive approximation of the constant mechanism serves as a benchmark
of efficiency for all impartial mechanisms with priors.
The analysis of AVD is considerably more involved than the analysis of the constant mechanism.
Roughly speaking, the important quantity that affects the additive approximation is the difference
between the maximum in-degree and the in-degree of the default node when two or more nodes
are tied with the highest in-degree, times the probability of this tie. In the a priori popularity model,
the in-degree 3 of a node is a random variable following the binomial probability distribution with
parameters = (the number of trials) and ? (the probability that a trial is successful). Furthermore,
the in-degrees of different nodes are independent. Hence, bounding the probability of a tie at the
maximum in-degree is related to (but more demanding than) bounding the probability that two
out of many independent binomial random variables take the same maximum value.
Unfortunately, even though problems of this kind have been studied in the literature of applied
probability and statistics (e.g., see [9, 12, 13]), the existing results have not been proved useful
for our purposes. When the difference between the maximum in-degree and the in-degree of the
default node is large, Chernoff bounds can unsurprisingly be used to show that the probability of
a tie at maximum is negligible and, hence, the contribution to the expectation of the quantity of
interest is negligible as well. The real challenge is when the difference of the two in-degrees is
small. In this regime, it turns out that we need sharp bounds on the ratio Pr[3 = G]/Pr[3 ≥ G]
(also called the hazard function) for a binomial random variable 3 and value G that is close to the
expectation ` = ?= of 3 (i.e., so that Pr[3 ≥ G] is only polynomially small in terms of =). As we







We believe that this technical tool can be of independent interest and could find applications
elsewhere. The bound is asymptotically tight; its tightness for ? = 1/2 is exploited in the proof of
our logarithmic lower bound (Theorem 13). The exact dependence on the quantity
√
min{`, = − `}
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is very important to achieve a polylogarithmic upper bound on the additive approximation of AVD
for every a priori popularity input. In addition to the above crucial idea and Chernoff bounds, our
proof in Theorem 13 involves an inverse Chernoff bound to bound from below the probability that
a binomial random variable is far from its expectation. These statements are less popular than
Chernoff bounds but rather standard.
1.2 Further related work
Impartial selection was introduced independently by Alon et al. [1] and Holzman and Moulin [19].
Alon et al. [1] proposed the approximation ratio as the fraction between the highest in-degree and
the (expected) in-degree of the winner. They provided a simple, 4-approximate randomized mech-
anism and noted that no randomized impartial mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio
less than 2, even with randomization. If randomization is not allowed, however, the approxima-
tion ratio can be arbitrarily large. Later on, Fischer and Klimm [15] introduced a 2-approximation
randomized mechanism, closing that gap. Bousquet et al. [8] proposed a randomized mechanism
with an arbitrarily close to optimal approximation ratio, provided that the maximum in-degree of
the graph is large enough.
Holzman and Moulin [19] considered various mechanisms under the more restricted family of
graphs where each node has an out-degree equal to 1. Among others, they proposed the plurality
with default mechanism, which can be seen as a version of AVDmechanism, tailored to that family
of inputs. They also came up with an important impossibility result regarding the quality of im-
partial mechanisms: Any deterministic impartial mechanism can guarantee, either to never select
0 in-degree nodes or to always select a unanimously nominated node, but never both. Variations
of the problem are studied in [6, 11, 23, 28, 29].
Additive approximation was first studied by Caragiannis et al. [10]. Therein, they propose sim-
ple randomized mechanisms with sub-linear additive approximation guarantees. They also show
that a specific class of deterministic mechanisms cannot achieve additive approximation less that
= − 1 (i.e. the worst possible additive approximation), while an equivalent class, in the random-
ized setting, cannot achieve additive approximation better than Ω(√=). For general deterministic
mechanisms however, they only show a lower bound of 2, while no deterministic mechanism is
knownwith additive approximation smaller than =−1. Closing this gap remains a tantalizing open
question.
Impartiality is encountered in various domains. In the AI literature, a related application is peer-
reviewing [3, 20, 21, 25]. In another direction, Babichenko et al. [4, 5] present impartial mechanisms
for the selection of the most influential node in a network. The main difference with our setting
is that the influence of a specific node does not depend merely on its in-degree, but also on all
the paths leading to that node. Mackenzie [24] analyses the papal conclave through the lens of
impartiality.
Our motivation for considering prior information comes from its successful application to auc-
tion and posted pricing mechanisms. An excellent survey of related work can be found in [17]. We
should also note that there is an interesting connection of the techniques needed for the analysis
in the a priori popularity model with the literature on random graphs [7, 16] and, in particular, re-
sults regarding the multiplicity of the highest in-degree in=,? graphs. Unfortunately, such results
have a focus on asymptotics: for example, en route to proving bounds on the chromatic number,
Erdős and Wilson [14] showed that the maximum degree is unique with probability 1 − > (1) in
=,1/2 graphs. Instead, for proving our approximation guarantees, we need sharp estimations of
the hidden > (1) term. So, such results are not directly applicable to our analysis.
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1.3 Roadmap
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin with preliminary definitions and tail in-
equality statements in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of the constant mechanism in
the opinion poll model. Our polylogarithmic additive approximation for AVD is presented in Sec-
tion 4 and the logarithmic lower bound in Section 5. We conclude with open problems in Section 6.
Two additional observations are given in the appendix.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We denote by # the set of individuals (or agents). For a set ( ⊂ # , we use #( as an abbreviation
of # \ ( and write #8,..., 9 instead of # {8,..., 9 } for simplicity. A nomination profile  = (#, ) is a
directed graph without self-loops that has the agents of # as nodes. Each directed edge (8, 9 ) ∈ 
represents a nomination from agent 8 to agent 9 . Occasionally, we refer to the outgoing edges
as votes. We define as G8 = {(8, 9 ) ∈ } the set of outgoing edges from node 8 ∈ # and use
the tuple x = (G1, ..., G=) as an alternative representation for  . We use x−8 to denote the graph
(#,  \ ({8} × # )).
Denoting by G the set of all nomination profiles over the agents of # , a (deterministic) selection
mechanism is simply a function 5 : G → # which maps each nomination profile to a single node
(the winner). A deterministic selection mechanism 5 is impartial when for any agent 8 ∈ # , any
graph x ∈ G and any set G ′8 of outgoing edges from node 8 , it is 5 (x) = 8 if and only if 5 (G ′8 , x−8) = 8 .
In other words, no agent (node) has any incentive tomisreport her preferences (its outgoing edges).
We use 3 9 ((, x) to denote the in-degree of node 9 ∈ # , taking into account only the incoming
edges from nodes of set ( , given the profile x, i.e.,
3 9 ((, x) = |{8 ∈ ( : (8, 9 ) ∈ }|.
We use the simplified notations 3 9 (x) when ( = # 9 . Δ(x) denotes the maximum in-degree of the
profile x, i.e., Δ(x) = max9 ∈# 3 9 (x). Following the work of Caragiannis et al. [10], we evaluate
the performance of a mechanism 5 on a nomination profile x using the additive approximation
Δ(x) − 3 5 (x) (x), i.e., the difference between the maximum in-degree over all nodes and the in-
degree of the winner returned by mechanism 5 .
We assume that the input is a random nomination profile (among the agents of # ), selected
according to a probability distribution P over all such profiles. We assume voter independence,
which means that the distribution P is a product
∏
8 ∈# P8 of independent distributions, where P8
denotes the distribution according to which node 8 selects its set of outgoing edges.
We examine a hierarchy of three families of distributions, giving raise to opinion poll, a priori
popularity, and uniform instances (or models), respectively:
• In the opinion pollmodel, each node 8 ∈ # selects its set of outgoing edges among all possible
edges to nodes of#8 , according to the probability distribution P8 . Due to voter independence,
the in-degree 3 9 (x) of each node 9 is equal to the sum
∑
8 ∈# 9 G8 9 of independent Bernoulli
random variables, each denoting whether the directed edge from node 8 to node 9 exists
in the nomination profile (G8 9 = 1) of not (G8 9 = 0). For simplicity of exposition, in our
proofs, we consider # to have = + 1 agents; then, the in-degree of each node is the sum of =
independent random variables.
• The a priori popularity model is the special case of opinion poll where each node 9 has
a popularity ? 9 ∈ [0, 1] and the directed edge (8, 9 ) exists in the nomination profile with
probability ? 9 , independently on all other edges. In this case, the in-degree of node 9 follows
the binomial distribution B(=, ? 9 ), where = denotes the number of trials and ? 9 is the success
probability for each trial.
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• We call uniform the special case of the a priori popularity model with ? 9 = ? for every
agent 9 .
We assume that prior information about the underlying probability distributions is known in ad-
vance. Hence, we examine selection mechanisms that are defined using this information and eval-
uate them in terms of their expected additive approximation
Ex∼P[Δ(x) − 3 5 (x) (x)] .
We use the term U-additive to refer to a selection mechanism with expected additive approxi-
mation at most U . Our aim is to design deterministic impartial selection mechanisms that have as
low as possible expected additive approximation in any distribution from the above classes. Our
positive results apply to opinion poll or to a priori popularity distributions; our proofs of negative
results use the simplest uniform ones.
2.1 Tail inequalities
We include some tail bounds here that will be very useful later in our analysis.
Lemma 1 (Hoeffding [18]). Let -1, -2, ..., -= be independent random variables so that
Pr
[
0 9 ≤ - 9 ≤ 1 9
]
= 1. Then, the expectation of the random variable - =
∑=
9=1 - 9 is E[- ] =
∑=
9=1 E[- 9 ] and, furthermore, for every a ≥ 0,





9=1 (1 9 − 0 9 )2
)
.
Lemma 2 (Chernoff bounds). Let  ∼ B(=, ?) and ` = =? . Then, the following inequalities hold
• Let G ≥ `. Then
Pr[ ≥ G] ≤ exp
(





if ` ≥ =/2, and
Pr[ ≥ G] ≤ exp
(





if ` < =/2 and, furthermore, G ≤ 2`.
• Let G ≤ `. Then,
Pr[ ≤ G] ≤ exp
(





if ` ≤ =/2, and
Pr[ ≤ G] ≤ exp
(





if ` > =/2 and, furthermore, G ≥ 2` − =.
Inequalities (2) and (4) are the standard Chernoff bounds; e.g., see [26]. Inequalities (1) and (3)
are due to Okamoto [27]. The following lemma (see [2], Lemma 4.7.2, page 116]) indicates that
Chernoff bounds are asymptotically tight.
Lemma 3. Let  ∼ B(=, ?) and X ∈ [0, 1 − ?). Then,
Pr[ ≥ =(? + X)] ≥ 1
√








1 − ? − X
)1−?−X )=
.
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In particular, we will utilize the following cleaner statement, which follows easily by Lemma 3.





























































The first inequality follows by Lemma 3 and since (? + X) (1 − ? − X) is at most 1/4. The second
inequality follows by the inequality 4I ≥ 1 + I for I ∈ R which implies that
√








. The third inequality follows since X ≤ 1/10. 
3 WARMING UP: THE CONSTANT MECHANISM
We first consider a simple mechanism, which we call the constant mechanism. This mechanism
ignores all edges and awards a particular preselected node, which we call the default winner (or
default node). The selection of the default winner depends only on the prior. For example, the





Our first statement is an upper bound on the additive approximation of the constant mechanism;
its proof follows by a simple application of the Hoeffding bound (Lemma 1).
Theorem 5. For opinion poll inputs, the constant mechanism that uses the maximum expected





Proof. Recall that, in the opinion poll model, the in-degree of node E is the sum of= independent
Bernoulli random variables, i.e., 3E (x) =
∑
D∈#E GDE. Then, a simple application of the Hoeffding
bound (Lemma 1) yields
Pr
[













Hence, the probability that some node has in-degree at least E[3 5co (x)] +
√
= ln= is at most the
probability that some node E has in-degree at least E[3E (x)] +
√
= ln=. By the inequality above
and the union bound, this probability is at most 2
=2
· (= + 1) ≤ 3= . Thus, the expected maximum
in-degree is
E[Δ(x)] ≤ E[3 5co (x)] +
√
= ln= + = · 3
=
≤ E[3 5co (x)] + 3 +
√
= ln=,
and the expected additive approximation E[Δ(x) − 3 5co (x)] is no more than 3 +
√
= ln=. 
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The bound in Theorem 5 is asymptotically tight. The lower bound instances that we use in the
proof of the next statement are the simplest ones: uniform instances with ? = 1/2. Consequently,
it holds for any selection of the default winner. The proof exploits the reverse Chernoff bound
(Corollary 4).





when applied to uniform inputs.
Proof. Consider a uniform prior with ? = 1/2 over = + 1 nodes, where = is large, e.g., = ≥
80. Then, the in-degree of any node D is a random variable following the binomial probability
distribution B(=, 1/2). Let D∗ = 5co be the node returned by the constant mechanism; clearly,





6 . By applying Corollary 4with X =
√
ln=
6= (the fact that= is large guarantees that X ≤ 1/10)
















for every node D ≠ D∗ and, hence,












where the second inequality follows by the inequality (1 − A/=)= ≤ 4−A and the third one by the
inequality 4I ≥ 1 + I (and, thus, 41/
√
2 ≥ 1 + 1/
√
2). We now have
E[Δ(x)] ≥ E[max
D≠D∗









Pr[E] + E[3D∗ (x)] Pr[E]









and the desired lower bound on the expected additive approximation E[Δ(x)−3D∗ (x)] follows. 
4 A PRIORI POPULARITY AND THE AVDMECHANISM
We devote this section to AVD mechanism and its analysis on a priori popularity instances. AVD
uses a preselected node C as the default winner. To give a formal definition of the mechanism,
we say that a non-default node : beats another non-default node 9 in the nomination profile x if
3: (# 9,:,C , x) > 3 9 (# 9,:,C , x), i.e., if node: has higher in-degree than node 9 when ignoring incoming
edges from nodes 9 , : , and the default node C . Node : beats (respectively, is beaten by) the default
node C if 3: (#:,C , x) > 3C (#:,C , x) (respectively, 3: (#:,C , x) < 3C (#:,C , x)). When applied on the
nomination profile x, AVD returns as the winner F the node that beats every other node, or the
default node if no node that beats every other node exists.2 We remark that the default node is not
prohibited to win by beating every other node.
Notice that, by misreporting its outgoing edges, a node cannot affect the set of other nodes it
beats. Hence, AVD is clearly impartial. In addition, the above formal definition allows us to observe
that the in-degree of the winner returned by AVD is never lower than the in-degree of the default
node C . Indeed, when the default node is not the winner, it is beaten by the winner, who has at least
as high in-degree. Hence, the upper bound of O(
√
= ln=) on the expected additive approximation
of the constant mechanism on opinion poll instances carries over to AVD mechanism when the
2The case in which no node beats every other node refines the notion of a tie that we informally used in Section 1.
Ioannis Caragiannis, George Christodoulou, and Nicos Protopapas 9
default node is selected to be a node of highest expected in-degree. In the following, we present a
much stronger result that applies specifically to a priori popularity instances.
Theorem 7. The AVD mechanism that uses the node of highest expected in-degree as the default
node has an expected additive approximation of O(ln2 =) when applied on a priori popularity in-
stances.
Again, for simplicity of notation, in our analysis of AVD,we consider profiles with=+1 nodes.We
assume that the number of nodes is large, e.g.,= ≥ 106 (otherwise, Theorem7 holds trivially). Let?:
be the popularity of node: and recall that the in-degree3: (x) of node: is a random variable taking
values between 0 and = following the binomial distribution B(=, ?: ), which is also independent
on the in-degree of the other nodes. Also, let `: = E[3: (x)] = ?:= and b: = min{`: , = − `: }.
We first consider the case of bC < 8200 ln=. This means that the expected in-degree of the
default node is either very high, i.e., `C > = − 8200 ln=, or very low, i.e., `C < 8200 ln=. When
`C > = − 8200 ln=, the expected degree of the winner (be it the default node or not; recall the
argument above that compares AVD with the constant mechanism) is more than = − 8200 ln=. As
3F ≤ =, the expected additive approximation is less than 8200 ln=. In the case `C < 8200 ln=,
a simple application of a Chernoff bound (i.e., the tail inequality (2) from Lemma 2) yields that
Pr[3: (x) ≥ 9000 ln=] ≤ =−26 and, hence, the expected additive approximation is at most =−26 ·= +
(1 − =−26) · 9000 ln= ≤ 1 + 9000 ln=.
So, in the following, we analyze the AVD mechanism assuming that bC ≥ 8200 ln=. Let ℎ be the
highest in-degree among all nodes. Denote by  the event that there is no node that beats every
other node and the default node is beaten by a non-default node of degree ℎ. The following lemma
addresses the simplest case where the event  is not true.
Lemma 8. E[(ℎ − 3F (x)) 1{}] ≤ 1.
Proof. If the event  does not hold, there must either be a node that beats every other node or
the default node is not beaten by any node of degree ℎ.
So, first, assume that there is a node F that beats every other node. The lemma follows if this
node has degree ℎ. Otherwise, let 8 be a node of degree ℎ. Since F beats 8 , we have 3F (x) ≥
3F (#8,F,C , x) ≥ 38 (#8,F,C , x)+1 ≥ 38 (x)−1 = ℎ−1 ifF ≠ C , and3F (x) ≥ 3C (#8,C , x) ≥ 38 (#8,C , x)+1 ≥
38 (x) = ℎ if F = C .
Now, assume that the default node is not beaten by any node of in-degree ℎ and there is no node
that beats every other node. In this case, the winner will be the default node C . The lemma clearly
follows if C has in-degree ℎ. Otherwise, since C is not beaten by some node 8 of degree ℎ, we have
3C (x) ≥ 3C (#8,C , x) ≥ 38 (#8,C , x) ≥ 38 (x) − 1 = ℎ − 1. 
We will now bound E[(ℎ − 3F (x)) 1{}]; to do so, we will use a structural lemma.
Lemma 9. Assume that  is true and let 8 be a node of highest in-degree ℎ that beats the default
node C . Then, there is a node 9 , different than 8 and C , that has degree either ℎ, or ℎ − 1, or ℎ − 2.
Proof. Since node 8 does not beat every other node, theremust be some node 9 that is not beaten
by 8 (clearly, 9 is different than C ). Then, 3 9 (x) ≥ 3 9 (#8, 9,C , x) ≥ 38 (#8, 9,C , x) ≥ 38 (x) − 2 = ℎ − 2. 
By Lemma 9, we can boundE[(ℎ−3F (x)) 1{}] by the expected value of the differenceℎ−3C (x)
for all possible values of the maximum degree ℎ, all possibilities for an agent 8 ≠ C having degree
ℎ and an agent 9 ≠ 8, C having degree either ℎ or ℎ − 1 or ℎ − 2, with the degree of the default node
ranging from 0 to ℎ and the degree of all other nodes ranging from 0 to ℎ as well. We have







(ℎ − 6) · Pr[3C (x) = 6]
∑
8 ∈#C
Pr[38 (x) = ℎ]




Pr[max{0, ℎ − 2} ≤ 3 9 (x) ≤ ℎ]
∏
:∈#8,9 ,C
Pr[3: (x) ≤ ℎ] (5)
For every : ∈ {1, ..., = + 1}, define the comfort zone /: of agent : to be the set of integers
{!: , ..., *: } with the boundaries satisfying !: ≤ `: ≤ *: and being defined as follows. The lower
boundary !: is equal to the highest integer 2 such that Pr[3: (x) < 2] ≤ =−5.33 or 0 if no such 2
exists. The upper boundary*: is equal to the lowest integer 2 such that Pr[3: (x) > 2] ≤ =−5.33 or
= if no such 2 exists. We use the terms “above /:” and “below /:” to denote the ranges of integers
(if any) {0, ..., !: − 1} and {*: + 1, ..., =}.
Now, by simple properties of the binomial distribution and the fact that node C has maximum
expected in-degree, we observe that if ℎ lies above the comfort zone of agent C , it also lies above
the comfort zone of agent 8 and, hence, Pr[38 (x) = ℎ] ≤ =−5.33. Also, if 6 lies below the comfort
zone /C , it holds Pr[3C (x) = 6] ≤ =−5.33. Furthermore, if ℎ − 2 lies above the confort zone / 9 , then
Pr[max{0, ℎ − 2} ≤ 3 9 (x) ≤ ℎ] ≤ Pr[3 9 (x) ≥ * 9 ] < =−5.33 as well. Since, trivially, ℎ − 3C (x) ≤ =,
the contribution of the at most =4 terms of the sum in which either ℎ or 6 does not belong to the
comfort zone /C or ℎ−2 lies above the comfort zone / 9 is at most =4 ·= ·=−5.33 < 1. Hence, equation
(5) becomes







(ℎ − 6) · Pr[3C (x) = 6]
∑
8 ∈#C :ℎ∈/8
Pr[38 (x) = ℎ]
·
∑
9 ∈#8,C :ℎ−2∈/ 9
Pr[max{0, ℎ − 2} ≤ 3 9 (x) ≤ ℎ]
∏
:∈#8,9 ,C
Pr[3: (x) ≤ ℎ] (6)
Our aim in the following is to evalute each term in the sum at the RHS of (6). To do so, we will need
three auxiliary technical lemmas. The proofs of the first two follow easily by applying Chernoff
bounds.
Lemma 10. For the boundaries of the comfort zone /C we have *C ≤ `C + 4
√




Proof. If `C ≥ =/2, by applying the tail inequality (1) from Lemma 2, we get
Pr[3C (x) ≥ `C + 4
√






2bC (= − bC )
)
≤ =−8.
If `C < =/2, observe that 4
√
bC ln= ≤ `C , by our assumption bC ≥ 8200 ln=. Hence, by applying the
tail inequality (2) from Lemma 2, we get
Pr[3C (x) ≥ `C + 4
√









The bounds on *C follows by its definition.
Similarly, if `C ≤ =/2, by applying the tail inequality (3) from Lemma 2, we get
Pr[3C (x) ≤ `C − 4
√






2bC (= − bC )
)
≤ =−8.
If `C > =/2, observe that `C −4
√
bC ln= ≥ 2`C −=, by our assumption bC = =−`C ≥ 8200 ln=. Hence,
by applying the tail inequality (4) from Lemma 2, we get
Pr[3C (x) ≤ `C − 4
√
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Again, the bound on !: follows by its definition. 
We will say that the comfort zones /: and /:′ almost intersect if !:′ −*: ≤ 2 or !: − *:′ ≤ 2.
For example, since ℎ ∈ /C and ℎ − 2 ∈ / 9 , the two comfort zones /C and / 9 almost intersect.
Lemma 11. If two comfort zones /: and /:′ almost intersect, then
3





b:′ ≤ 2516 b: .
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that `: ≤ `:′ ; the other case is completely symmetric.
Then, !:′ − *: ≤ 2, which, using the facts b: , b:′ ≤ `:′ and `:′ ≥ 8200 ln= as well as Lemma 10,
implies that
`:′ ≤ 2 + `: + 4
√
b: ln= + 4
√
b:′ ln= ≤ 2 + `: + 8
√











which clearly implies that `:′ ≤ 43`: .
Also, observe that
max{b:′, b: } −min{b:′, b: } ≤ `:′ − `: ≤ 2 + 4
√
b: ln= + 4
√
b:′ ln=
≤ 2 + 8
√









which implies that max{b:′, b: } ≤ 2516 min{b:′, b: } as desired. 
We now prove the most important technical lemma in our analysis.
Lemma 12. Let ℓ ∈ {0, 1, 2} and ℎ be such that ℎ ∈ /C and ℎ − 2 ∈ /: for some agent : . Then,




· Pr[3: (x) > ℎ] .
Proof. By the definition of the binomial distribution, we have





?I: (1 − ?: )
=−I
for every integer I with 0 ≤ I ≤ =. Let G be any positive integer with G ≤ `: + 4
√
b: ln=. For every
integer ~ > G , we have
Pr[3: (x) = G]
















(G + 1) · (G + 2) · ... · ~
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≤ exp
(
(~ − `: ) (~ − G)
`:
+ (~ − `: + 1) (~ − G)
= − ~ + 1
)
(7)
The first inequality follows since G < ~. In the second inequality, we have used the properties




1−I ) for I ≠ 1.
We now use inequality (7) to argue that by selecting ~ such that ~ > ℎ − ℓ and
(~ − `: + 1) (~ − ℎ + ℓ) ≤
3
11
(bC − ~ + `: ), (8)
we get
Pr[3: (x) = ℎ − ℓ]
Pr[3: (x) = ~]
≤ 4. (9)
Recall that /: and /C almost intersect. Hence, we have `: ≥ 3`C /4 (by Lemma 11), and (8) yields













Furthermore, using again (8), and the inequalities `: ≤ `C and bC ≤ = − `C , we get
(~ − `: + 1) (~ − 3 + ℓ)
= − ~ + 1 ≤
3
11
· bC − ~ + `:
= − ~ + 1 ≤
3
11
· bC − ~ + `C
= − ~ + 1 ≤
3
11
· = − ~




Inequality (9) now follows by inequalities (7), (10), and (11).
Solving inequality (8), we get that the range of values for ~ so that (9) is true satisfies
ℎ − ℓ < ~ ≤
ℎ − ℓ + `: − 1411 +
√







Hence, the number of integer values for ~ so that ~ > ℎ − ℓ and (8) holds is at least
ℎ − ℓ + `: − 1411 +
√




− ℎ + ℓ − 2
=
√
(ℎ − ℓ − `: )2 + (3 − ℓ − `: ) + 1211bC +
196
121 − (ℎ − ℓ − `: + 96/11)
2
+ 2. (12)
The derivative of the quantity at the RHS of (12) with respect to ℎ is
2(ℎ − ℓ − `: ) + 1
4
√






i.e., it is decreasing. Since ℎ − ℓ ∈ /: and /: and /C almost intersect, using Lemmas 10 and 11 we
have ℎ − ℓ − `: ≤ 4
√
b: ln= ≤ 5
√
bC ln=. Hence, we can bound the RHS of (12) as follows:
√

















(ℎ − ℓ − `: )2 + (3 − ℓ − `: ) + 1211bC +
196
121 + (ℎ − ℓ − `: + 96/11))
+ 2
=




(ℎ − ℓ − `: )2 + (3 − ℓ − `: ) + 1211bC +
196
121 + ℎ − ℓ − `: + 96/11
) + 2








25bC ln= + 5
√











In the second inequality, we have used 905
√
bC ln= ≤ 10bC and 820 ≤ bC to bound the numerator by
bC (recall that bC ≥ 8200 ln=), while the parenthesis in the denominator is clearly at most 12
√
bC ln=.








+ 2. By the discussion above, for G = ℎ − ℓ we have
Pr[3: (x) = ℎ − ℓ] ≤ 4 Pr[3: (x) = ~]
for ~ = ℎ − ℓ + 1, ℎ − ℓ + 2, ..., ℎ − ℓ + A + 2. By summing these inequalities for ~ = ℎ + 1, ..., ℎ + A , we
get




Pr[3: (x) = ~] ≤ 4 Pr[3: (x) > ℎ]
and, equivalently,
Pr[3: (x) = ℎ − ℓ] ≤
4
A




Pr[3: (x) > ℎ] .
The lemma follows. 













Pr[3C (x) = 6] ≤ 64bC ln=. (13)





Pr[38 (x) = ℎ] Pr[max{0, ℎ − 2} ≤ 3 9 (x) ≤ ℎ]
∏
:∈#8,9 ,C












Pr[38 (x) > ℎ] Pr[3 9 (x) > ℎ]
∏
:∈#8,9 ,C
Pr[3: (x) ≤ ℎ]
≤ 209088 · 42 · ln=
bC
. (14)
since the last double sum is simply the probability that exactly two agents have degree higher than
ℎ (and, hence, has value at most 1). Using (13) and (14), equation (6) yields E[(ℎ −3F (x)) 1{}] ≤
1 + 108 · ln2 = and the proof of Theorem 7 is now complete. 
5 A LOWER BOUND FOR AVD
In this section, we prove the following lower bound for the uniform domain.
Theorem 13. When applied on uniform instances with ? = 1/2, the AVD mechanism has expected
additive approximation Ω(ln=).
With uniform instances, the in-degree of each node follows the binomial distribution. In the
proof of Theorem 13, we use the random variables  and ′ following the distributions B(=, 1/2)
and B(= − 1, 1/2), respectively. We also assume that = is sufficiently large.




. Similarly, let ! be the lowest integer




. Consider the following event  :
Ioannis Caragiannis, George Christodoulou, and Nicos Protopapas 14
• The default node has degree at most =/2,
• two non-default nodes (called the potential winners) have the same in-degree 3 ∈ [! + 1,* ],
without counting the edges between them,
• the remaining non-default nodes (called the losers) have in-degree at most 3 − 1.
Then, AVD returns the default node as a winner and the additive approximation is at least ! −=/2.
We will show that E[(! −=/2) 1{}] is Ω(ln=), proving the lemma. In particular, we will use the
inequality










Pr[′ = 3]2 · Pr[ ≤ 3 − 1]=−2. (15)
The RHS of equation (15) is the product of the lower bound of the additive approximation ! − =/2
when event  happens, with 1/2 which is (a lower bound on) the probability that the default node
has degree at most =/2, and with the probability Pr[′ = 3]2 that the two potential winners have
degree 3 (ignoring the edges between them) and the probability Pr[ ≤ 3 − 1]=−2 that the losers




selections of the two potential winners.
We will make use of a series of lemmas to bound the several quantities that appear in the RHS
of equation (15).








that X ≤ 1/10 since = is large), we have Pr
[









for the random variable
 ∼ B(=, 1/2). The lemma follows by the definition of !. 
Lemma 15. * ≤ =2 +
√
= ln=.
Proof. A simple application of the Chernoff bound (inequality (1) from Lemma 2) to the bino-
mial random variable  ∼ B(=, 1/2) yields Pr
[










. The lemma then
follows by the definition of * . 
Lemma 16. For the random variable  ∼ B(=, 1/2), it holds that
Pr[ = G] ≥ 2! − =
=
· Pr[ ≥ G],
for every integer G ≥ !.
Proof. Consider integers G,~ with ! ≤ G ≤ ~. By the definition of the binomial distribution
B(=, 1/2), we have
Pr[ = ~]







G !(= − G)!
























2! − = · Pr[ = G] ≤
=
2! − = · Pr[ = G],
and the lemma follows by rearranging. 
Ioannis Caragiannis, George Christodoulou, and Nicos Protopapas 15
The proof of the next lemma follows a similar roadmap with the proof of Lemma 12 in Section 4
but is considerably simpler. In the proof, we will use the following claim, which will also be useful
later. The proof follows easily by the definition of the binomial distribution.
Claim 17. For the random variable  ∼ B(=, 1/2) and integers G and ~ with G ≤ ~, it holds that





· Pr[ = ~] .
Proof. By the definition of the binomial distribution B(=, 1/2), we have
Pr[ = G]














Lemma 18. For the random variable  ∼ B(=, 1/2), it holds that








Proof. By Claim 17, we have
Pr[ = * ]











for every integer ~ > * . The second inequality follows since 4I ≥ 1 + I for I ∈ R. By selecting ~
such that
(~ −* ) (2~ − =)
= − ~ ≤ 1, (17)
we get
Pr[ = * ]
Pr[ = ~] ≤ 4. (18)
Solving inequality (17), we get that the range of values for ~ so that (18) is true satisfies
* < ~ ≤
2* + = − 1 +
√
(2* − =)2 + 6= − 4* + 1
4
.
Hence, the number of integer values for ~ so that ~ > * and (17) is satisfied is at least
2* + = − 1 +
√





(2* − =)2 + 6= − 4* + 1 − 2* + = − 5
4
. (19)
Now observe that the quantity at the RHS of (19) is non-increasing with respect to * since its
derivative
2* − = − 1
2
√
(2* − =)2 + 6= − 4* + 1
− 1
2
is non-positive. So, we can bound the RHS of (19) from below using the upper bound on * from
Lemma 15. We get
√
(2* − =)2 + 6= − 4* + 1 − 2* + = − 5
4
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=




(2* − =)2 + 6= − 4* + 1 + 2* − = + 5
)
≥ 4= − 24
√
= ln= − 25
4
(√
4= ln= + 4= − 4
√
= ln= + 1 + 2
√








In the last inequality, we have used 24
√
= ln= + 25 ≤ = to lower-bound the numerator by 3= and
5 ≤
√
= ln= to upper-bound the parenthesis in the denominator by 6
√
= ln=.








. Multiplying inequality (18) by 1/A and summing these inequalities for
~ = * + 1, ..., * + A , we have





Pr[ = ~] ≤ 4
A








as desired. The last inequality follows by the definition of* . 










































= −* (* − ! + 1)
)
· = − !
















The first inequality is obvious, while the second one uses the definition of * and ! (recall that








). The third inequality follows by Claim 17. The fourth
inequality follows by Lemma 18, the fifth one follows since * ≥ ! and by the definition of* , and
the sixth one follows by Lemma 14 and the fact ! ≥ =/2.
By Lemma 15 and due to the high value of =, 2= − 3* ≥ =/3. Hence, inequality (20) implies that
* − ! ≥ 2= − 3*








Lemma 20. Let  ∼ B(=, 1/2) and ′ ∼ B(= − 1, 1/2). For every integer G ∈ [! + 1,* ], Pr[′ =
G] ≥ 23 Pr[ = G].
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Proof. By the definition of the binomial distribution, Lemma 15, and the facts that G ≤ * and
that = is large (the last two imply that G ≤ 2=/3), we have














Pr[ = G] . 
We are now ready to bound E[(!−=/2) 1{}] from below. Using equation (15), and the lemmas
above, we have




































































The second inequality follows by Lemma 20. The third inequality follows by Lemma 16. The fourth
inequality follows by the definition of ! and * . Finally, the fifth inequality follows by Lemma 14,







≥ 1/4 . Theorem 13 follows. 
6 OPEN PROBLEMS
Our polylogarithmic upper bound in Section 4 shows that prior information can yield dramatic
improvements on the performance of simple impartial selection mechanisms. It also gives hope
that AVD could be similarly efficient for the more general opinion poll instances. Unfortunately,
this is not true as the following counter-example indicates.
Indeed, starting from a uniform instance with = + 1 nodes of popularity ? = 1/2, we add a new
copy 9 ′ for each node 9 . Also, for every edge (8, 9 ) realized in the original instance, we add the edge
(8, 9 ′). In this way, we construct opinion poll instances with 2(=+1) nodes, where no node can ever
beat all the other nodes. Hence, in such instances, AVD will behave as the constant mechanism in
the original instance and will always return the default node as winner. By applying Theorem 6
we obtain the following negative result for AVD.




We should note that the above construction is fragile, in the sense that it exploits a very specific
aspect of the mechanism. So, still, the quest of designing deterministic mechanisms that achieve
polylogarithmic additive approximation in the opinion poll model is very important and challeng-
ing. A starting step could be to restrict our attention to the instances considered in [19], in which
every voter approves exactly one other candidate.
Finally, throughout the paper, we have assumed that the prior information is reliable. This
should not be expected to be the case in practice. We expect that our results on the constant mech-
anism still hold if we have a rough estimate of the highest in-degree. Highest accuracy seems to
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be necessary to recover our polylogarithmic upper bound though. This issue is also related to the
strengths of prior-independent mechanisms (e.g., see Section 4.3 of [17]) and needs to be investi-
gated further.
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A APPENDIX: MULTIPLICATIVE APPROXIMATION AND VOTER CORRELATION
In the following, we briefly justify two main decisions that we have taken. First, we show that
knowing the prior cannot help us improve the approximation ratio of 2 that is best possible for
worst-case inputs. This explains why we have completely ignored the study of multiplicative ap-
proximations when prior information is available.
We extend the approximation ratio d of a mechanism 5 against a prior P as follows:
d =
Ex∼P[Δ(x)]
Ex∼P [3 5 (x) (x)]
Theorem 22. For every n > 0, no impartial selection mechanism has approximation ratio better
than 2 − n against all uniform priors.
Proof. Consider uniform instances with two nodes D and E of popularity ? . Clearly, E[Δ(x)] =
1 − (1 − ?)2 = 2? − ?2. We show that for every impartial mechanism 5 , it holds E[3 5 (x) (x)] ≤ ? .
The theorem then follows by taking ? to be sufficiently small.
Indeed, consider the profile consisting of the two directed edges between D and E and let @D and
@E be the probabilities that the winner is node D and node E , respectively. Impartiality means that
node D is the winner with probability @D at the profile consisting only of the directed edge from E
to D and node E is the winner at the profile consisting only of the directed edge from D to E with
probability @E. Overall,
E[3 5 (x) (x)] = (@D + @E) · ?2 + @D · ? · (1 − ?) + @E · (1 − ?) · ? ≤ (@D + @E) · ? ≤ ?.
Notice that our argument includes randomized mechanisms that may return no winner with pos-
itive probability at some profiles. 
Second, we show that our assumption about voter independence is crucial since, otherwise, even
our most appealing AVD mechanism has linear additive approximation.
Example 1. Consider the following instance with 8: + 2 nodes partitioned into sets of nodes 
and  of 4: nodes each and two additional nodes 0 and 1. Node 0 is approved by no node with
probability 1/2 and all the 4: nodes of set  with probability 1/2 (i.e., there is correlation between
the votes in ). Similarly, and independently from the approvals to node 0, node 1 is approved by
no node with probability 1/2 and by all nodes of set  with probability 1/2. Notice that there is
always a tie and hence AVD always selects the default node, which cannot have expected in-degree
higher than 2: . The expected highest in-degree is 4: with probability 3/4 and 0 with probability
1/4, i.e., an expected highest in-degree of 3: . Hence, the additive approximation is : , i.e., linear in
the number of nodes.
